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CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFICIENCY
David M. Driesen∗

INTRODUCTION
Neoclassical economic theory seems to aptly characterize contract
law’s essence. Contracts enable two parties to reach a mutually beneficial
agreement, thereby facilitating economically efficient transactions.
This article will examine an alternative hypothesis—that contract
law is about enforcing some inefficient bargains in order to provide enough
security to make people cooperate over fairly long periods of time. On this
account, contract law manages change over time, rather than achieves static
efficiency.1
The traditional account explains why parties make contracts, i.e.
because they anticipate benefits exceeding the costs of carrying out their
bargain.2 Yet, the neoclassical account does not explain the law of
contracts, which except in narrow circumstances coerces involuntary
performance or payment of damages later on, when one party no longer
agrees to perform. The breaching party presumably has determined that
performance does not provide benefits exceeding that party’s costs. If a
mutual agreement indicating an efficient contract continued to exist,
probably nobody would need to enforce the contract. The law of contracts
exists because often something changes after the parties sign a contract
making continued performance inefficient. Hence, contract law is largely
∗

University Professor, Syracuse University. The author wishes to thank Douglas
Kysar for his suggestion that he develop this idea as a law review article; Aviva
Abramovsky, Robin Malloy, and Eric Posner for helpful comments; and Maria Scandia for
research assistance. The author takes responsibility for any errors.
1
See generally Patrick Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94
L.Q. Rev 193, 196 (1978) (noting that “contracts have a chronology” since performance
comes after agreement). The term “static efficiency” highlights a key feature of standard
definitions of economic efficiency—their assumption of a given technological state. See
DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4 (2006) (noting
that “economists define allocative efficiency in terms of matching supply and demand for a
given technological state”).
2
In saying that the traditional account explains why parties make contracts, I do not
mean to suggest that it constitutes a complete explanation of contracting behavior. Cf. Ian
R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877,
878-883 (2000) (describing a contract as an ongoing relationship among people rather than
as a plan for a discrete transaction).
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about enforcing inefficient agreements in order to manage change over
time, in other words the economic dynamics involved in carrying out a
bargain.3
This way of viewing contract law provides fresh insights into the
traditional law and economics approach to contract law. The traditional
approach involves an effort to establish which contract rules are efficient.4 It
often proceeds as if efficiency were a unitary thing realizable by contractual
parties if only the law creates the proper incentives. But the analysis
supporting the contrast between efficient contracts and inefficient contract
law suggests that efficiency has a temporal dimension and that some
inefficiency is inevitable in markets, no matter what legal rules judges
establish. What appears efficient at one time may prove inefficient at
another. Although the economics literature recognizes that efficiency over a
short time frame may not correspond with efficiency over a longer time
frame, the law and economics of contract slights this point.5
This view of contract law as often enforcing inefficient transactions
in order to provide a stable framework for managing change over time leads
to a rich set of results. It casts into doubt a major rationale for focusing so
much of the study of contract law on efficiency—the idea that inefficient
contractual rules prove futile. That is not to say that the debunking of the
futility rationale alone settles the debate between those emphasizing
efficiency factors in contract law and those focused more on fairness.6 But it
does set the stage for rethinking efficiency’s role.
At the same time, this insight helps explain some of the principle
results seen in work reflecting an efficiency-based approach to contract law.
It turns out that a number of important claims about the efficiency of laws
3

Cf. Melvin A Eisenberg, Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 805, 807 (2000) (claiming that classical contract law was “static” in that it focused on
a single instant of time instead of an ongoing relationship).
4
See Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure?, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 832-34 (2002) (summarizing the dominant approach to
economic analysis of contract law).
5
See Christopher Cornwell, Peter Schmidt, and Robin C. Sickles, Production
Frontiers with Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Efficiency Levels, 46 J.
ECONOMETRICS 185, 185-200 (1990) (discussing models where efficiency varies over
time); cf. TIM COELLI, D.S. PRASADA RAO, AND GEORGE E. BATTESE, AN INTRODUCTION
TO EFFICIENCY AND ANALYSIS 213 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003) (1998) (showing
that some models assume no technological change); SUBAL C. KIMBHAKARM AND C.A.
KNOX LOVELL, STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS 10 (2000) (showing that early panel data
models assumed time invariant efficiency, but subsequent models relaxed that assumption).
6
See Symposium, Fault in American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2009)
(discussing the role of fairness implicated in taking fault into account and that of efficiency
in contract law); Atiya, supra note 1, at 217 (discussing the tension between efficiency and
fairness in contract law).
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governing breach of contract depend heavily upon the underlying models’
temporal assumptions. Change those assumptions and you can change the
results. My account then adds to existing explanations of indeterminacy in
the law and economics of contract.7
My analysis also helps explain the exceptions to the general rule that
courts enforce inefficient contracts. In particular, traditional efficiencybased accounts cannot explain the courts’ emphasis on unusual
circumstances as a prerequisite to discharge of contractual obligations on
grounds of impracticability or impossibility. An account that views contract
law, not as assuring efficiency, but as providing a stable environment for
parties to cooperate over long periods of time provides a more convincing
explanation of these excuse doctrines.8
Recognizing that contract law manages change over time rather than
ensures efficiency leads to a suggestion for enhancing economic analysis of
contract law, increased emphasis on economic dynamic analysis—a form of
institutional economic analysis that emphasizes analyzing bounded
rationality and competing economic incentives in order to understand how
law will actually influence future events.9 I show that Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner have, in fact, employed economic dynamic analysis in their seminal
work on default rules in contract and corporate law.10 I will argue in a
forthcoming book that many of our most perceptive scholars employ
economic dynamic analysis in a variety of areas and provide a normative
justification for emphasizing the study of economic dynamics.11 Here, I
confine myself to arguing for an economic dynamic approach to contract
law.
This article begins with an explanation of how the neoclassical
model explains voluntary contracts. The second part explains and defends
the hypothesis that contract law requires enforcement of inefficient
bargains. The third part explains why enforcement of inefficient bargains
7

Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 853 (finding the indeterminacy to be a result of complex
models); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 630, 635-36 (1988) (explaining that in the absence of
transaction costs any damages rule is efficient, as the parties will always bargain to an
efficient result).
8
Cf. Richard Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 824 (2000) (describing long-term cooperative relationships as
hallmarks of “relational contracts”).
9
See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 7-9 (describing economic dynamic analysis and its
roots in institutional economics); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic
Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1811 (2000) (finding bounded rationality “especially
salient” to understanding contracts).
10
See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989).
11
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW (2011) (forthcoming).
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serves important economic purposes. The fourth part explores the
implications of recognizing the existence and value of judicial enforcement
of inefficient exchanges. This recognition calls into question the idea of
making efficiency the sole normative goal for contract, illuminates the
dependence of efficiency analysis on temporal assumptions, and helps
justify case law on the excuse doctrines. The fourth part closes with a call
for an economic dynamic approach to contract law, an explanation of
economic dynamic analysis to inform that approach, and a description of
how leading scholars have tacitly begun to employ this approach.
I. EFFICIENT CONTRACTING
The neoclassical economic model provides a very satisfying
explanation of why parties enter into contracts. Parties enter into contracts
voluntarily. Accordingly, each party to the contract must anticipate that
carrying out the deal embedded in the contract will provide benefits to
herself exceeding her costs.12
For example, suppose that a homeowner offers to pay a painter
$5,000 to paint her house. The homeowner must anticipate that the value of
the benefit she receives, a new paint job, will equal or exceed the $5,000
cost she will incur if the painter accepts her offer. Similarly, if the painter
accepts this offer, then he must anticipate that the $5,000 benefit he will
receive will exceed the cost he incurs in painting the house—the value of
the time spent doing the work and the cost of supplies. Economists define
exchanges generating benefits exceeding costs for both parties as efficient,
in the sense of being a “Pareto Optimal” exchange.13
Pareto efficiency has special normative appeal precisely because it
brings benefits to both parties to an exchange and parties make contracts to
realize that sort of efficiency. Accordingly, my analysis of contract law’s
inefficiency will define efficiency in terms of Pareto Optimality. I will,
however, address contract law’s relationship to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—
the definition of a transaction as efficient when one’s party’s gains could, in
principle, allow her to fully compensate any person who suffered losses
from the transaction14—in part IV. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency proves
problematic normatively, because it does not require the party gaining from
12

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (2nd ed. 1977) (stating
that a voluntary transaction occurs when both parties expect it to make them better off).
13
See Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 278-80 (1970) (explaining Pareto optimality and
defending it as a normative goal).
14
See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 162 (1982) (defining Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency in terms of the capacity to compensate losers, where or not compensation
actually occurs).
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a transaction to compensate the other party for her losses, but continues to
play a role in law and economics.15
The most fundamental models of markets build on this idea of
Pareto efficient contracting. Neoclassical economics assumes that the
homeowner expects a certain utility from her new paint job. Let us say that
this utility equals $7,000. It follows that she will voluntarily pay any
amount up to $7,000 for the paint job. She would prefer to pay as little as
possible, of course, but she will pay any amount up to $7,000, but not one
penny more. The painter’s utility will equal the payment for the paint job.
The painter, however, will incur costs in realizing this utility. Suppose that
the painter expects that he will need to devote $3,000 worth of his time on
the job and to spend $1,000 on supplies. He will be willing to undertake the
job for any amount exceeding her $4,000 cost. The painter will prefer to get
paid as much as possible, but any amount over $4,000 provides sufficient
utility to justify the cost.
In this case, the parties will agree on a paint job costing between
$4,000 and $7,000. Any deal in that range will provide an efficient
exchange making both parties better off. And, of course, this basic model
applies to all kinds of contracts, not just painting contracts. People make
deals because their expected utility functions overlap.
The explanation above uses the words “anticipate” and “expect” a
lot, for a reason. People contract in order to try and realize an exchange in
the future, and they do so based on their expectations for the future.16
Suppose, however, that the buyer is completely insane and the idea
of a newly painted house calls forth a vision of a luminous house unlike that
produced by any real world paint job. In that case, her expectations may
bear no relationship to the utility an actual paint job will provide. The
completed house will look nice, but it will provide nothing like the degree
of utility she envisions when she agrees to spring for $5,000. If that is true,
then her agreement to the exchange will not indicate likely Pareto
Optimality. Neoclassical economists address this problem by assuming that
market actors are rational, in that they rationally pursue their own
purposes.17
Now suppose that the painter has no idea how much time the job
15

See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 580 (1997) (pointing out that
because Kaldor-Hicks efficiency lacks Pareto Optimality’s “attractive consensual” feature,
it is less normatively attractive).
16
See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L. J. 1261, 1266-1267 (1980) (insisting on a conceptual
distinction “between the promise itself and the future benefit it foretells”).
17
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 12 (describing the assumption that human behavior is
“rational and self-interested” as a “basic economic assumption.”)
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will require or how much supplies will cost. In this case, there is no reason
to think that the $5,000 payment the painter has agreed to accept will
exceed the painter’s cost and agreement does not necessarily indicate a
likely Pareto Optimal exchange. Neoclassical economists solve this problem
by assuming that actors have perfect information. It is reasonable to assume
that well-informed rational actors’ voluntary contracts will usually lead to
efficient exchanges.18
Notice that the neoclassical economists’ standard assumptions of
perfect information and rationality provide a link between the moment of
contracting and the future event of performance. These assumptions make it
likely that the apparently efficient exchange anticipated in the contract will
prove efficient when the exchange occurs. In other words, these
assumptions seek to overcome the vagaries of the links between current
actions and future events.
We can extend this simple model temporally to explain a little more
fully when a contract will likely produce voluntary compliance without
formal invocation of law. Assume that the parties agree at t1 to a $5,000
paint job to be performed at a later time, t2. Suppose that nothing changes
between t1 and t2. It is likely that the parties will perform their contract in
this case.19 The transaction agreed to at t1 because it appeared efficient
remains mutually advantageous at t2, so the parties will likely perform.20
In most instances, neither party has a need to resort to contract law
when the mutually advantageous deal at t1 remains mutually advantageous
at t2.21 The law’s coercive force is not needed because performance is
generally in both parties’ interest. Just as their self-interest was adequate to
motivate voluntary contracting at t1, it should subsequently prove adequate
to motivate voluntary performance at t2, at least in most cases.22

18

ID. at 11 (stating that “we can be reasonably confident” that a voluntary transaction
produces a “net increase in efficiency”).
19
See Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best
World, 19 J. LEGAL STUDIES 43, 53 (1990) (constructing a model based on the assumption
that sellers will not breach when the cost of performance is less than the contract payment).
20
Cf. POSNER, supra note 12, at 65 (stating that the exchange process operates reliably
in “many cases . . ., especially where the exchange is simultaneous” the parties “fully and
correctly apprehend” the exchange’s costs and benefits).
21
I do not mean to suggest that these are the only cases where contracting parties are
likely to self-enforce. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 546 (2003) (pointing out that parties will selfenforce when the losses are less than the stream of future benefits from a series of future
contracts or less than the value of reputational damage from a breach).
22
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?: An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L J. 704, 718 (1931) (noting how seldom law directly touches any case where
performance has occurred).
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II. INEFFICIENT CONTRACT LAW
A variation on this simple temporal model can explain why parties
sometimes resort to contract law, rather than voluntary fulfillment of
promises. Suppose that the painter’s cost rises between t1 and t2, so that at t2
it exceeds the $5,000 the homeowner has promised to pay for the paint job.
This could occur because the painter underestimated the amount of time the
job requires (a fairly common problem with contracting for paint jobs or
construction) or because the cost of paint rose. At this point, the painter has
an interest in not painting the house, because the cost of the job outweighs
the benefit (a $5,000 payment). Because it is not in her interests to complete
the job, she may fail to perform.23
Economically speaking, exchange can also become inefficient
because new opportunities arise. For example, suppose that at t1 our painter
agrees to paint the house in our earlier example for $5,000 at t2. Before t2
occurs, a second homeowner offers our painter $10,000 to paint his house at
t2. Assume no flexibility about timing in either case. If the painter fulfills
the original contract, he will incur a $5,000 opportunity cost, the difference
between the $10,000 foregone opportunity and the $5,000 earned under the
original contract. Neoclassical economics treats lost opportunities as
equivalent to losses, so this implies a $5,000 loss. It has now become
inefficient for the painter to fulfill the contract.24
If the painter does not paint the house, the homeowner may sue to
compel performance. The purpose of contract law, of course, is to compel
performance of a contract when promised performance does not occur. Law
is about compulsion, always, even if the compulsion follows voluntary
agreement.25 A court enforcing a contract will compel the breaching party to
perform or pay damages. It does not secure voluntary compliance; it coerces
compliance with a contract when one party has decided not to comply.
In other words, law comes into play when a voluntary agreement at
t1 does not lead to voluntary compliance at t2. This difference between t1 and
t2 frequently arises because intervening events have made a contract that

23

See Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 1273 (characterizing a new event making
contractual performance a losing proposition as a “regret contingency”).
24
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 89-90 (using a different hypothetical to illustrate the
desirability from an efficiency standpoint of allowing parties to breach contracts when a
better opportunity arises); Craswell, supra note 7, at 634 (describing the situation of a seller
under contract for the sale of goods breaching because somebody else offered a higher
price for the same goods as the situation “most often modeled” in discussions of efficient
breach).
25
See Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 711 (describing contractual enforcement as the
“forcible holding of a man . . . to a promise”).
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appeared to serve both parties interests cease to serve one party’s interests.26
If follows that law usually comes into play when performance of a
contract becomes inefficient. Recall that neoclassical economics defines
efficiency during contract formation in terms of a transaction generating a
Pareto Optimal exchange, meaning a transaction that benefits both parties.
Non-performance triggering contract law usually indicates that the
transaction itself did not benefit both parties. The transaction, of course,
occurs at t2. Contract law comes into play when a transaction that appeared
Pareto Optimal at t1 reveals itself to be inefficient, or at least not Pareto
Optimal, at t2.
Contract law generally does enforce contracts in some fashion, even
when one party does not want to perform. Classical contract law,
summarized by the dictum pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be
observed), provided at best limited exceptions to this duty to perform.27
Indeed, some early English cases appear to take the position that even the
impossibility of performance does not excuse a breach of contract.28 Under
that theory, even if our hypothetical house went up in flames before the
painter could complete his paint job, a court would hold the painter liable
for breach of contract. More commonly, the common law only excused
performance for acts of God and other similar unusual contingencies
outside of the parties’ control.29
Even under the modern law of contracts, which excuses
26

See Sykes, supra note 19, at 48-49 (characterizing cases involving “sellers whose
fixed-price contracts have become highly unprofitable” as “the most commonly litigated
cases.”); Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just
Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 564
(1977) (describing “changed conditions” modifying an agreement’s “perceived
advantages” as the ordinary “motivation for breach”).
27
See Waukesha Foundry v. Industrial Eng’g, 91 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996)
(equating pacta sunt servanda with the idea that “a deal’s a deal”); see, e.g. Stees v.
Leonard, 20 Minn. 494, 20 Gil 448 (1874) (awarding damages for failure to comply with a
contract for erection of a building, when the contractor constructed a three story building
twice, only to have it collapse because of quick sand); Butterfield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 667
(Mass. 1891) (holding a contractor liable when the building he constructed burned to the
ground after being struck by lightning).
28
See, e.g., Paradine v. Jane, 23 Car. Rot. 897 (stating that when a party “by his own
contract creates a duty . . . upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notwithstanding any accident or inevitable necessity”).
29
See, e.g., 407 East 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37, 41
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1968) (describing the impossibility defense as limited to “destruction of the
means of performance by an act of God, vis major, or by law”) (citations omitted). Cf.
William Herbert Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance,
18 MICH. L. REV. 589, 592-94 (1920) (noting that while the courts sometimes cite an act of
God in excusing performance, the impossibility defense extends to acts of human agency
and do not include all acts of God).
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performance more liberally,30 a price rise that does nothing more than make
a contract a money loser for one party does not excuse performance.31 The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-615(a) provides an impracticability
defense to sellers failing to deliver goods in a timely manner, but the
commentary on that section insists that “increased cost alone does not
excuse performance,” while acknowledging that some unusual
contingencies raising prices might furnish a valid excuse, such as war or
local crop failure.32 Furthermore, “a mere showing of unprofitability”—a
showing sufficient to show a lack of Pareto Optimality—does not (without
more) “excuse performance.”33 For example, in Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.34 the 7th circuit ordered damages paid for breach of
a contract to deliver fertilizer35. In response to Texas Gulf Sulphur’s
argument that the Canadian government’s closure of the mine it intended to
rely on as a supply source made fulfillment of the contract “impracticable,”
the court held “the fact that performance has become burdensome or
unattractive is not sufficient for performance to be excused.”36 In
demanding “unattractive” performance, it implicitly denied the relevance of
efficiency to contract law; for Pareto Optimal exchange is, by definition,
attractive to both parties. The law regularly enforces bargains that the
parties expected to be Pareto-efficient, but proved not to be.37
Notice that models to address the problem of an unforeseen event
occurring between t1 and t2 cannot be based on perfect information. The
problem of an unforeseen event arising occurs because parties cannot have
perfect information about the future, which is, in a fundamental way,
always unknowable.38
30

See Kevin M. Teevan, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and its
Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 422-23 (1996) (describing the liberalization of the
impossibility doctrine).
31
See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, 517 F.
Supp. 1319, 1324 (1981) (declaring that a contractual loss does not justify a holding of
impracticability).
32
U.C.C. § 2-615(a) cmt. 4 (1977).
33
Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co, 256 Or. 539, 474 P.2d 529, 530 (1970). Cf. Florida
Power & Light v. Westinghouse, 826 F.2d 239, 277 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding
impracticability when a loss was “four or five times the expected profit”); Sykes, supra
note 19, at 77-79 (criticizing the reasoning in Florida Power and finding it has nothing to
do with efficiency).
34
508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974)
35
Id. at 293-295 (denying a defense of commercial impracticability and giving
instructions to the trial court about how to ascertain the amount of damages).
36
Id. at 293.
37
See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (1966)
(closure of Suez Canal producing an additional $44,000 in cost from longer shipping route
does not excuse payment of the $305,843 contract price).
38
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 727 (1974)
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Thus, parties contract in order to realize an efficient exchange. But
the law of contracts exists to force the exchange to occur, or an appropriate
monetary substitute, when the transaction proves inefficient and therefore
induces the losing party to breach the contract.
III. THE PURPOSES OF ENFORCING INEFFICIENT BARGAINS
Enforcing inefficient bargains serves the purpose of fostering
economic cooperation over extended periods of time.39 In societies without
well-developed formal legal systems to enforce inefficient bargains, some
exchange still occurs. But the exchanges may often be limited to
instantaneous sales.40 Long-term cooperation in such societies typically
arises between people sharing kinship ties or other long-term affiliations
that allow them to trust each other to carry out bargains without invoking a
legal system’s formal mechanisms of coercion.41 Long-term cooperation
between strangers may be hard to come by in such societies, and this dearth
limits opportunities for economic development.42
Enforcement of inefficient transactions increases parties’
willingness to contract in the first place.43 If a party can count on
enforcement of a bargain, then it makes sense to contract at t1 for
performance at t2, rather than just wait for t2 in order to realize an
instantaneous exchange.44 Parties in a system with regular enforcement of
inefficient contracts will make contracts that appear efficient at t1. They still
have no incentive to choose contracts they expect will prove inefficient,
(describing “much of the future” as inherently unknowable); see Posner, supra note 4, at
865 (commenting that if parties “could foresee every possible future state of the world’ and
contract accordingly “contract law would be simple and uninteresting.”).
39
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 558-59 (pointing out that the law of
property adequately governs simultaneous exchange, but that the law of contract governs
promises about future behavior).
40
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 66 (claiming that the absence of enforceable
contractual rights biases investment toward short-term projects).
41
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 1272 (modeling the tendency of people to keep
promises to family members and close friends); Macneil, supra note 38, at 718 (suggesting
that in “traditional societies” kinship helps “project” exchange “into the future.”)
42
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 548 (describing “good contract law” as “a
necessary condition for a modern commercial economy.”); Llewellyn, supra note 22, at
720-21 (explaining that informal sanctions may suffice where close ties and face-to-face
dealings prevail, but that contract law is essential for long-range impersonal bargains and
investment).
43
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 1264 (decisions to enforce promises influence
“future promising.”).
44
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 559-61 (explaining that absent enforcement
of an original contract, sellers would refuse to contract to sell a specialized product at a
future date). The law of anticipatory breach seeks to deal with this problem. Id. at 561.
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because one party usually will not voluntarily agree to assume losses. And,
as mentioned previously, many of the contracts that appear efficient at t1
will prove efficient at t2. Thus, enforcement of a few inefficient exchanges
encourages many more efficient exchanges. In other words, optimizing each
transaction that happens to end up in court does not necessarily optimize the
far larger universe of contractual exchange of which litigated cases form a
tiny part.45
The willingness to enforce inefficient exchange at the heart of
contract law serves many purposes apart from encouraging efficient
contracting.46 The ability to count on performance (or a monetary
equivalent) of a contract facilitates all sorts of economic planning and
cooperation.47 It greatly reduces transaction costs and creates important
economic growth opportunities,48 and may do so even when the exchange
itself is inefficient.
Let us return to our painting example to illustrate contract law’s
capacity to foster economic growth by reducing transaction costs. If our
homeowner could not rely on the painter performing, because the painter
remains free to walk away if a better opportunity arises, she might try to
line up back-up painters or constantly contact her original painter to try and
anticipate a potential breach (hoping to call up new painters once a breach
appears imminent). If the painter in fact walked away, she would incur
additional transaction costs in finding a new painter. In a world welcoming
inefficient breach of contracts, these transaction costs may multiply,
because often a single contract forms but a part of a larger economic plan
that a party struggles to coordinate and execute.49 A paint job, for example,
can constitute but one step of a remodeling project involving multiple
contractors, with interdependent start and completion dates, so that a failure
45

Cf. Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contracting in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 740
(2000) (explaining that “relational contracts” sometimes require subordinating “short-term
self-interest” in order to produce long-term cooperation).
46
Cf. POSNER, supra note 12, at 66 (emphasizing that contract law provides for more
efficient allocation of resources, because a seller can look for the best deal with more
temporal flexibility).
47
See Feinman, supra note 45, at 742 (identifying allowing implementation of plans as
a central norm in relational contract theory). Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 556
(pointing out that enforcement of contract permits “persons to enlist other persons in their
projects”).
48
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 562 (the absence of contractual enforcement
helps explain the dearth of foreign investment in former Soviet States and many Third
World countries).
49
See Macneil, supra note 38, at 760 n. 201 (providing an example of a contract as
part of a plan involving multiple parties and contracts); see generally Goetz & Scott, supra
note 16, at 1267 (pointing out that advance notice of a benefit conferred via contract can
encourage adaptive behavior that increases the value of the transaction promised).
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to perform the paint job can lead to rescheduling other contractors and all of
the costs (time and trouble) that implies. In such cases, transaction costs can
become high enough to discourage worthwhile projects when the party
coordinating a series of contracts cannot rely on performance, and some of
these costs will go beyond the costs stemming only from a single contract.50
Moreover, contracts do not merely allocate existing resources; they
sometimes create economic growth opportunities. A contract between an
inventor and a manufacturing firm to produce a new kind of product
provides an example. Such a contract may bring to life an innovation having
positive spillover effects benefitting society, leading to fresh economic
opportunities for people other than the contracting parties.51 In such cases,
even a contract that causes losses to one or both of the contracting parties
can produce economic growth of much greater value than the losses
stemming from contractual performance.52
I have argued elsewhere that economic growth frequently involves
inefficiency, since it often stems from sometimes unsuccessful
experimentation and loss.53 For example, e-commerce—commerce
conducted over the internet— rests on a foundation of inefficient
transactions. Amazon.com, which pioneered the e-commerce model,
engaged in numerous inefficient money losing transactions, leading to years
of business losses, in order to entice customers to become accustomed to
making purchases in cyberspace.54 Although the law and economics of
contract has focused on the microeconomics of individual exchange, the
economic dynamics of contract law may have greater importance.55 That is,
50

See, e.g., Leon K. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial
Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 489 (1985) (explaining that termination of a longterm relationship without modification of an agreement can lead to “exit” and “start up”
costs).
51
See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007) (explaining that intellectual property often generates positive spillovers,
benefits that accrue to non-parties to a transaction).
52
Cf. Richard Craswell, In That Case, What is the Question? Economics and the
Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 903, 909 (2003) (suggesting that a supply
contract making both parties better off can be bad for society if too much pollution is
emitted in producing the supply); Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the
Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 593-94 (1987) (pointing out that optimizing a
transaction between two parties does not necessarily improve society’s efficiency).
53
See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that innovation and growth depend upon
experimentation, which often involves failure and inefficiency).
54
See ID. at 6 (explaining that Amazon.com incurred substantial losses in its early
years and predicting that if the company survived it would show that “inefficient
investment” proved beneficial over the long term).
55
See ID. at 4 (questioning whether static efficiency merits the “obsessive attention” it
has received in light of the importance of economic growth stemming from innovation and
change).

[7-Feb-11]

CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFICIENCY

13

contract law may create the security people need to take the risks that
produce economic growth in the long run, even if many transactions leading
to this growth prove inefficient.56 In other words, the macroeconomics of
contract law, its role in providing a framework for economic growth, may
matter far more than the consistent achievement of microeconomic
efficiency in each transaction.
Contract law seeks to give economic actors a stable framework in
which to plan, in spite of the inevitability of change in a dynamic world. It
manages change over time, not by assuring that every transaction has a
happy ending for all involved, but by making economic cooperation
between strangers over time a reasonable thing to undertake.57
This implies that contract law does not ensure efficiency. Rather, it
provides a framework that parties can employ to pursue their own purposes,
including the purpose of mutually beneficial exchange.58 Markets may tend
toward efficient outcomes. But the law’s pursuit of inefficiency plays an
important role in making that possible and in providing even more
important benefits.59
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Contract law’s inefficiency raises some major questions about the
rationale for making the pursuit of efficiency the central project of contract
law scholarship, helps explain the disparate results evident in law and
economics scholarship, and provides a basis for a more sympathetic
understanding of contract law itself. It suggests, I argue, that we should
embrace an economic dynamic approach to analysis, which, I show, some
leading scholars have already pioneered in this area. I will consider each of
these points in turn, focusing on the law governing what happens when a
party does not perform contractual obligations to illustrate them.
A. On Efficiency’s Centrality
Richard Posner’s early work provides a seemingly cogent rationale
for making efficient contract law the primary normative goal for judicial
56

See generally Atiyah, supra note 1, at 197-98 (noting that the primary purpose of
contract enforcement is to encourage people to keep their promises).
57
See id. at 199 (describing contract as encouraging cooperation and planning but
accepting that “some would rise and some would sink”).
58
Cf. Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 763, 776-77 (1998) (describing contract as involving norms of “solidarity
and reciprocity” not just maximization of net utility).
59
See generally Macneil, supra note 2, at 893 (stating that there may be good reasons
for contract law not to track the norms governing contracting).
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decisions. Inefficient contract law, Posner wrote, would prove futile,
because parties seeking mutually beneficial exchanges would generally
contract around it.60 This futility rationale fails to appreciate contract law’s
temporal dimension and its limitations as a device to cope with the
uncertainty that afflicts any effort to address the future.61 Since parties
cannot predict what will occur between t1 and t2, they will not necessarily
anticipate which common law rules will prove inefficient at t2.62 They
cannot contract around inefficient judicial rules unless they can anticipate
which judicial rules will prove inefficient in their case, which they often
cannot do at t1.63
Recognition that the common law insists on inefficiency and in
doing so may facilitate parties’ efforts to provide a stable framework for
their projects in an uncertain world casts some doubt on the wisdom of
making efficiency such a dominant consideration in contract law
scholarship. Although, recognition of contract law’s inefficiency does not
necessarily prove that the traditional efficiency project lacks normative
value, the analysis supporting it does cast doubt on one of the major
arguments for making efficiency the dominant goal of contract law
scholarship.
B. A Temporal Explanation for Efficiency Analysis’ Struggles
The analysis undergirding the tension between efficient contracts
and inefficient contract law helps explain the difficulties efficiency-based
scholars have experienced in reaching consistent results. The efficiencybased approach has a positive dimension. Richard Posner’s early work
attempted to show that the common law of contract is efficient.64 Eric
Posner in a thoughtful review of the law and economics of contract
60

Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83, 89 (1977) (“If the rules of
contract are inefficient, parties will . . . contract around them”). Accord Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 21, at 546 (“firms will contract away from . . . legal rules that do not maximize
joint surplus”).
61
Cf. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60, at 89 (qualifying his claim that parties will
contract around inefficient rule by recognizing an exception when “transaction costs . . .
outweigh the gains from a more efficient rule.”)
62
Cf. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Judicial Error,
94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 751 (2000) (acknowledging that parties to “long-term contracts” at
least face an “intractable problem” in not being able to predict future events).
63
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 812 (arguing that contracting parties
systematically underestimate future risks).
64
Craswell, supra note 52, at 904 (suggesting that Richard Posner aimed to
demonstrate contract law’s efficiency and that this claim became viewed as a central claim
of law and economics).
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concludes that this project has failed.65 In explaining the reasons for this
failure, he echoes a familiar institutional economic critique of neoclassical
economics in general; models simple enough to yield definite predictions
fail to sufficiently capture the real world, and models rich enough to
reasonably emulate the real world fail to yield definitive predictions.66
Although this may often be correct,67 the need to enforce inefficient
exchanges in order to foster future efficient contracts suggests a more
specific problem: Efficiency has a temporal dimension. What appears
efficient over one timeframe is not necessarily efficient over another.68
Analysts obtain varying results, because results depend in part on the
timeframes employed in the underlying models.
The insight that inefficient performance creates a lot of contract law
suggests that efficiency analysis requires a unified treatment of the question
of what to do when breach occurs.69 Traditional law and economics
bifurcates consideration of what happens after performance becomes
inefficient mostly along doctrinal lines found in the case law. Courts
address this problem through two sets of rules. The first governs contractual
remedies, such as when to award damages and when to order specific
performance.70 The second set of rules governs affirmative defenses, such
as the defenses of impracticability and impossibility.71 The law and
economics of contract law, while sometimes unifying the economic analysis
65

See Posner, supra note 4, at 830 (stating that the models do not “predict contract
doctrine.”). Cf. Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Law Scholarship, 112 YALE L. J. 881,
881-82 (2003) (not contesting Posner’s descriptive claim about law and economics’ failure
to “predict” common law rules, but finding more normative value in recent law and
economics contract scholarship than Posner does); Craswell, supra note 52, at 923-24 (not
contesting Posner’s specific claims, but arguing that the law and economics of contract has
been successful at casting some light upon normative choices).
66
Posner, supra note 4, at 830. Cf. BRIAN J. LOASBY, CHOICE, COMPLEXITY AND
IGNORANCE (1976).
67
Cf. Daniel Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages
for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1449-50 (1980) (explaining that the simplest
model of all, one that ignores transaction costs, cannot yield definitive results, since that
model predicts that all rules are efficient).
68
Eric Posner implicitly recognizes this when he explains that contract remedies
influence the “search for the optimal partners prior to contracting.” Posner, supra note 4, at
838. This comment represents a shift in temporal frame from a post t1 to a pre-t1
perspective.
69
Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A
Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 353 (1988) (arguing that both breach of contract
and discharge of contract remedies should follow a unified theory).
70
See II E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, ch. 12 (2004)
(summarizing the law of contractual remedies).
71
See ID. ch. 9 (summarizing the doctrines of mistake, impracticability, and
frustration).
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of different affirmative defenses,72 usually treats the economics of
affirmative defenses and remedies as separate questions and uses differing
modes of analysis for each question.73
The judge facing this problem of what to do when a promisor
breaches a contract has three principle options. She can discharge the
obligation, order the payment of damages, or require specific
performance.74 One might think that efficiency-based law and economics
scholarship would offer a simple unified answer to this question of what
courts should do when performance becomes inefficient in all cases:
namely, that when performance of an obligation has become inefficient the
court should discharge the obligation. But the common law does not
produce this or any other unified answer to the question of what to do about
inefficient performance. And law and economics in an attempt to justify, at
least to some extent, actual legal doctrine addresses the problem of the
tension between an efficient ex ante contract and inefficient ex post
performance by employing inconsistent timeframes for analysis to try and
produce results bearing some resemblance to the common law.75
1. The T2 Approach to Damages and Efficient Breach
The law and economics addressing “efficient breach” focuses on the
law of contractual remedies. Many contracts scholars working in the
neoclassical tradition of law and economics favor the idea that when
fulfilling a contract becomes so costly in t2 that performance would no
longer lead to an efficient transaction, the party facing the high costs should
be encouraged to breach the contract.76 Thus if a painter with a contract for
72

See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60, at 84-86 (arguing for a unified
approach to “discharge cases” involving the affirmative defenses of impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration of purpose).
73
See POSNER, supra note 12, §§ 4.5, 4.9 (treating the law and economics of
“impossibility and related doctrines” separately from that of “contract damages”). Cf.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 207, 242-47 (2009) (urging a form of expectation damages as relief for violation
of a “bounded-risk” test derived from impracticability doctrine); White supra note 69, at
353 (calling for a theory unifying remedy and discharge analysis).
74
To simplify the exposition and align it with the dominant discourse in law and
economics, I ignore, for the time being, the remedy of reformation of the contract. Cf.
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60 (discussing the law of discharge, but ignoring
reformation). I do, however, mention reformation below when necessary to qualify an
assertion.
75
Cf. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 847, 849 (2000) (describing pursuit of ex ante efficiency as the “default” strategy of
“the law-and-economics branch of relational theory”).
76
Birmingham, supra note 13, at 284 (arguing that repudiation of a contract should be
encouraged when the breaching party profits after compensating the other party to the
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a $5,000 paint job finds that the job would cost $7,000 to perform (or
$5,001), she should usually feel free to breach the contract. Similarly, if the
painter contracted for a $5,000 paint job, but had an opportunity to earn
$7,000 by substituting another job, she should usually feel free to breach the
contract.77 Contract scholars refer to this as “efficient breach” since
breaching the contract avoids an inefficient transaction.78
Most contract scholars, however, do not recommend discharge of
contracts that demand performance that appear inefficient; instead they
endorse the common law rule that the breaching party should pay damages
representing the expectations of the promisee, the homeowner in my
painting example.79 They typically justify this endorsement of the
expectation damages remedy by arguing that it provides sufficient
incentives to avoid inefficient breach.80 To see why expectation damages
should provide incentives to avoid inefficient breach imagine that the
painter’s costs for the $5,000 paint job have risen to $6,000, but that the
contracting homeowner’s expected utility from the $5,000 job equaled
$7,000. In that case, performance for a $5,000 payment would produce a
$2,000 benefit to the homeowner ($7,000-$5,000) and only a $1,000 loss to
the painter ($5,000-$6,000). Breach would be inefficient, say the
proponents of expectation damages, because performance would generate a
$1,000 net benefit ($2,000-$1,000).81
This argument assumes a redefinition of efficiency. An exchange
involving a loss to one party (the painter) flunks the Pareto efficiency test.
contract); Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 558 n. 19 (arguing that the compensation
principles of contract law are generally consistent with “a theory of efficient breach”);
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
77
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 90 (using a similar example and arguing that breach
of contract “should be encouraged” as value maximizing in this situation).
78
See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDENA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 138-39
(2006) (describing the doctrine of efficient breach).
79
See Posner, supra note 4, at 834-35 (explaining that law and economics scholars
have argued that an expectation measure of damages encourages only efficient
performance); see generally Atiyah, supra note 1, at 210-11 (distinguishing expectation
damages from damages predicated on reliance). Cf. Daniel Friedman, The Efficient Breach
Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 3 (1989) (claiming that while the efficient breach theory was
“originally . . . preached” without “qualification,” the modern position distinguished
between “opportunistic breach” and other inefficient breaches).
80
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 90 (explaining the reasons for this conclusion); cf.
Craswell, supra note 7, at 636-37 (pointing out that expectation damages do not fully
compensate promises, because they often exclude, attorneys’ fees, subjective losses, and
unforeseeable damages); Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based on
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565
(1986) (discussing in detail the reasons that damages often are not fully compensatory).
81
See White, supra note 69, at 357 (explaining the efficient breach theory
algebraically).
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But because the homeowner receives enough added utility so that she could,
in principle, compensate the painter for the loss, this sort of transaction
satisfies the criterion for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
As long as the painter must pay the $2,000 net benefit that the
homeowner expects under the contract in the event of a breach as
expectation damages, the painter has an incentive to perform this
unprofitable contract, since not performing will raise his losses from $1,000
to $2,000.82 If the painter, however, could secure a discharge of the
contract, he would avoid a $1,000 loss and have no incentive to perform this
unprofitable, but still Kaldor-Hicks efficient, contract. Hence, expectation
damages provide an incentive to breach inefficient contracts, while carrying
out Kaldor-Hicks efficient contracts.
This analysis employs a post-t1 timeframe for analysis. It is
concerned with efficiency over the timeframe that begins when a new
circumstance arises after t1 rendering a contract unprofitable until the time a
judge considers and decides a case, t3.
This justification for preferring expectation damages to discharge of
an inefficient contract depends not only on a particular timeframe, but also
upon a strong perfect information assumption. The painter, in order to
receive the proper signal to avoid inefficient breach and commit efficient
breach whenever possible must know the utility function of the homeowner.
In this example, the painter must somehow have figured out that
notwithstanding the $5,000 contract price, the homeowner, in fact, was
willing to pay up to $7,000 for the job. This sort of knowledge may often
prove difficult to come by83 for the following reasons. A contracting party
has an incentive not to disclose his utility function to the other party,
because doing so helps the other party secure more of the gains from trade
at the disclosing party’s expense.84 Second, a utility function is an abstract
concept used in economic modeling that in many contexts proves difficult
to discover.85 Because the painter probably does not know the homeowner’s
82

Cf. Llewellyn, supra note, at 738 (expressing doubt that damages deter breach).
See Friedman, supra note 79, at 10 (pointing out that it’s very difficult to know how
much value a homeowner would place on a renovation); Alan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271 (1979) (arguing that valuation difficulties are ever
present so that specific performance is a better default rule than the payment of damages).
84
Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 836 (finding expectation damages undesirable when
information is asymmetric).
85
See MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 80-83, 94-100
(2004). Sagoff distinguishes between market prices and the maximum willingness to pay,
arguing that market prices do not measure consumer benefit, because they are more driven
by production costs than willingness to pay. ID. at 81-82. He shows a utility function’s
abstractness by demonstrating that maximum willingness to pay is not measurable. ID. at
82-83, 94-100. Unfortunately, maximum willingness to pay, not a market price, determines
the amount of consumer surplus (or more precisely promisee surplus) involved in an
83
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utility function, the painter cannot predict whether breach will prove
efficient or not under a rule embracing expectation damages. Accordingly,
the expectation damages rule does not necessarily enable a promisor to
carry out “efficient” breach while eschewing inefficient breach. Hence, if
one relaxes the perfect information assumption at the heart of neoclassical
law and economics and acknowledges that breach occurs with uncertain
knowledge about its future effects on the non-breaching party, then there is
an uncertain basis for choosing between the expectation damages rule and
discharge, at least from the temporal perspective usually employed to
analyze efficient breach, which basically starts sometime after t1 when
breach is contemplated.
A shift in temporal frame backward in time to t1, however, might
provide a more robust justification for the preference for expectation
damages. Judicial handling of breach after t2 will influence parties’
willingness to contract at t1 in the first place.86 If the promisee (the
homeowner in this case) cannot rely on obtaining the benefits contracted for
in the first place, why bother with a contract? Hence, a rule requiring
expectation damages will provide more security for contracts than a rule
permitting discharge in the event of efficient breach.87
Yet, once one moves back in time to t1 and relaxes the unrealistic
perfect information assumption, the idea that one wants to encourage
efficient breach comes into doubt. At t1, the parties do not know that a party
unprofitable transaction. And it is this surplus that a promisor must measure to determine
whether a breach would be efficient or not.
Goetz and Scott argue for using market prices of performance as the basis for
expectation damages, as courts generally do. Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 569. But this
remedy should be seen as a second-best proxy for the party’s actual utility function, as a
market represents an average of various arrangements reflecting intersections of different
utility functions, not the actual benefit from a transaction to an individual promisee. Goetz
and Scott go on to acknowledge that promisees may attach “idiosyncratic value” to
performance that varies significantly from market valuation. Id. at 570. Sagoff, however,
shows that the problem is more systematic than that. Market prices just do not measure
consumer (promisee) benefit except in cases where transactions generally confiscate all
consumer (promisee) surplus. Cf. SAGOFF, supra at 94-96 (showing that the amount of
consumer surplus cannot be measured, because divergence between consumer utility and
market prices cannot be observed); ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, III, vi,
5 (1890). In addition, some goods, such as unique goods, have no markets, so in some cases
market prices do not exist as a basis for damages and courts order specific performance.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 569-70.
86
See Craswell, supra note 7, at 630-31 (characterizing early analysis of efficient
breach as “too narrow” because of failure to consider remedies’ influence on the
willingness to contract and other questions at t1).
87
Cf. Sykes, supra note 19, at 83 (pointing out that application of the impracticability
doctrine to cases involving a poorly chosen escalator clause may encourage breach in
hopes of obtaining a discharge).
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will ultimately find a contract unprofitable and might want to breach. So,
any rule or attitude that encourages nonperformance lessens the value of
contracting, as parties would like to be able to count on their commercial
plans being carried out.
Instead of facing the likelihood that most parties contract to reduce
their uncertainties in an uncertain world, law and economics generally
approaches the problem of the apparently efficient becoming inefficient
through the endorsement of legal fictions.88 That is, many law and
economics scholars ask what the parties would have wanted had they faced
the circumstance making performance inefficient—just as courts often do.89
Hence, a subsidiary justification for the attitude and rule favoring efficient
breach comes from the assumption that parties would have contracted for
expectation damages if they had provided for the possibility of breach at
all.90
The tension between efficient contracting and efficient contract law
illuminates an important ambiguity in this position. The endorsement of
what the parties “would have done” does not refer explicitly to t1 or t2. We
know that the parties did not contract for expectation damages explicitly;
hence a court relying on the fiction does not effectuate a presumptively
efficient contract actually entered into at t1.91 From the perspective of t2, we
know that performance would prove inefficient, and no decision about
whether or not to order a transfer payment (damages) will cure that. Except
perhaps for reformation of the contract to change its terms to create a new
mutually beneficial contract, a court lacks the power to restore an efficient
bargain once circumstances have rendered performance inefficient.92 This
88

See Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability: Searching for the Wisdom of Solomon, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1127-28
(1987) (describing the presumption that parties intended what they reasonably would have
intended had they confronted the new circumstances arising in a case as a “fiction”).
89
See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60, at 98 (characterizing the supply of
contract terms that the “parties would have adopted if they had expressly negotiated over
them” as “the purpose of an economically based discharge doctrine.”); Craswell, supra
note 7, at 633 (characterizing the approach of recommending the rule that parties would
prefer as “by far the most common approach” to contract remedies). Cf. Page, supra note
29, at 600 (referring to the creation of an “implied condition” as a “fiction”).
90
Cf. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 732 (arguing that “no man is safe” if courts construe
contracts not to have the result that seems intended).
91
See Halpern, supra note 88, at 1140 (expressing doubt that courts can construct
actual intent in the face of contractual silence). Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, supra note 73, at
212-24 (explaining why bounded rationality indicates that “some things go without saying”
in a contract).
92
See generally Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts,
71 IND. L. J. 45 (1995); Trakman, supra note 50, at 487 (endorsing modification of
contracts involving interdependent parties in a long term relationship in a relatively closed
market, but not for “low-volume, short-term contracts”).
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fiction then obfuscates time and circumstances’ defeat of the parties’
intentions to realize an efficient bargain. And it draws attention from
legislative task implicit in an efficiency based approach to remedies, the
task of writing rules for the benefit of other parties than the ones before the
court. That task, of course, involves a conflict between writing rules to
encourage efficient conduct at t2 and writing rules tending to encourage
maximization of the number of efficient contracts to be entered into at t1.
The legal fiction also raises some problems for party autonomy.93
Parties remain free to write a contract to say that a cost rise above a certain
amount excuses performance with or without damages. If they did not do
so, this might suggest that they wanted performance, pure and simple.94
An even bigger problem for efficient breach comes from recognition
of transaction costs. One virtue of a tradition of voluntary performance,
even in the case of a contract becoming inefficient, is that it avoids the
expense and trouble of litigation. Since in the presence of a loss parties
often cannot separate efficient from inefficient breach very readily owing to
imperfect information, one would expect that encouragement of efficient
breach would lead to frequent litigation.
Once analysts consider litigation and transaction costs, however, a
question about expectation damages and efficient breach comes from
another direction. Daniel Farber has pointed out that expectation damages
may prove insufficient to deter inefficient breach of contracts with
consumers.95 Since most consumers will not have the resources to sue for
breach of contract, courts may need to award damages exceeding
expectation damages in the handful of cases that get litigated just to deter
companies from taking advantage of consumers’ inability to enforce their
contractual rights.96 Farber’s insight helps justify the continued existence of
some awards of super compensatory damages in contract cases.97
2. The T1 Approach to Affirmative Defenses
Although the standard law and economics of efficient breach and
93

See Halpern, supra note 88, at 1167 (discussing the tension between “freedom of
contract” and presumed intent).
94
Cf. Page, supra note 29, at 600 (characterizing treating a question of whether to
discharge a contract for impossibility as one about parties’ intentions as harmful when
parties had no intention respecting the facts giving rise to the defense).
95
See Farber, supra note 67, at 1455-64. Cf.. Craswell, supra note 7, at 664-665
(finding Farber’s rationale “somewhat problematic,” because of how it influences decisions
other than the initial one of selecting contracting partners).
96
Farber, supra note 67, at 1444-45 (discussing how consumers’ frequent inability to
litigate or detect violations makes damages exceeding compensatory damages desirable).
97
See id. at 1445 & n. 14 (using the term supercompensatory damages to describe any
damage award exceeding the amount needed to fully compensate the plaintiff).

22

CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFICIENCY

[7-Feb-11]

damages tends to focus on the post-contractual timeframe beginning after
an event raising performance’s cost, the leading articles on the excuse
doctrines (primarily the doctrines of impossibility and impracticability)
employ a larger timeframe habitually, beginning their analysis at the time of
contracting, t1. From the t2 standpoint, one might argue that courts should
excuse performance whenever performance would prove impossible and
award damages whenever performance is merely inefficient. This position
would amount to a repudiation of the impracticability doctrine, a position
broadly consistent with earlier mainstream common law.98 The position that
impracticability should give rise to expectation damages rather than excused
performance would be broadly consistent with the position of those who
insist that efficient breach should lead to expectation damages. That is, one
would expect that in the face of commercial impracticability, breach would
prove efficient, and therefore should be allowed, at least under the
mainstream position on efficient breach, only upon payment of expectation
damages (lest inefficient breaches be unduly encouraged).99
Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield, however, justify the
modern trend toward excusing “impracticable” performance by shifting the
timeframe for analysis back to t1.100 In a seminal article, they argue that
“discharge should be allowed only where the promisee is the superior risk
bearer.”101 This superior risk bearer approach makes the decision about
whether to excuse performance hinge upon an analysis of who was in the
best position to insure against a loss or to prevent a loss from occurring.102
Since a party would typically insure against a risk prior to the time when the
risk could arise, this insurance function implies an evaluation of efficient
risk bearing at the time of contracting, t1. Risk prevention would
presumably occur between t1 and t2, but prior to the risk actually arising.
Hence, the efficient risk bearer approach to analyzing the economics of
excuse implies a temporal frame reaching back to the time of contracting
and proceeding forward up to the time the risk arose, with no consideration
98

See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 45-48 (1974) (discussing American
common law’s position endorsing absolute liability, but suggesting that actual decisions
were less absolute); Sykes, supra note 19, at 73-74 (noting that early common law confined
itself to cases of impossibility, but that in time the courts accepted an impracticability
defense).
99
See White, supra note 69, at 354 (taking the position that breaching a contract
should always trigger damages, never discharge).
100
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60, at 84 (arguing for the “economic logic” of
the common law doctrines of impracticability and excuse).
101
Id. at 90.
102
See, e.g., id. at 100-108 (providing examples, all of which implicitly view the
question of who could have managed the risk from the perspective of contracting before the
risk arose).
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of events at t2 or later. In other words, the timeframe conventionally
employed for analyze application of the excuse doctrines lasts until the
approximate time frame employed to analyze remedies begins.103
This approach also embraces a move away from assuring the
efficiency of each individual contractual performance, the concern
animating the efficient breach literature, to the creation of rules that Posner
and Rosenfield imagine will encourage efficient risk allocation in a broad
class of contracts at t1.104 An economic dynamic focus on change over time
raises some questions about this approach. Posner and Rosenfield point out
that the excuse doctrines only come into play when contracts do not
specifically allocate the risks of performance becoming impossible or
impracticable.105 Parties presumably fail to allocate risks explicitly when
the transaction costs of doing so exceed their best estimates of the value of
explicitly allocating risks.106 That is, even if a court enjoying the benefit of
hindsight can judge what risk allocation would have proven efficient, a
failure to contract for that allocation suggests that ex ante the value of
explicit risk allocation was not apparent to the parties.107 It is not at all
obvious that a rule favoring the party with the least ability to avoid or insure
against the risk that produced litigation leads to more explicit and accurate
evaluations of risk and their efficient allocation ex ante. Indeed, it is not at
all clear that any particular legal rule about what would happen in the case
of impossibility or impracticability would lead to more efficient risk
allocation, as the parties operate in a world of very incomplete information
about the sorts of considerations that give rise to impracticability and
impossibility claims.108 Also, Posner and Rosenfield’s analysis, in keeping
103

These timeframes will dovetail precisely if the promisor makes a decision about
whether to perform just after the changed circumstance raising the issue of nonperformance arises and the risk prevention opportunity continues until then. A time lag,
however, can exist between the last time available for preventing a risk and the time that
the promisor contemplates breach.
104
See id. at 113 (characterizing their approach as focused on “ex ante risk bearing”)
[italics added].
105
Id. at 98-99.
106
See Scott, supra note 75, at 862 (describing high transaction costs as the “first
reason why parties might not write complete contracts”). Transaction costs, however, do
not constitute the only explanation for failures to specifically allocate risks. See id. at 86263 (discussing asymmetric information and the simple inability to foresee some future
conditions at all as explanations for incomplete contracts).
107
See Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 251 (describing Posner and Rosenfield’s tacit
assumption that parties will appraise the relevant risks’ “probability and magnitude” as
“incorrect”).
108
Cf. Aaron J. Wright, Note: Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the
Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2200-11 (2005) (finding that
bounded rationality influences a party’s ability to anticipate risks, but not the question of
who is the least cost insurer of an identified risk).
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with the case law, focuses only on the risk that actually became a real
impediment to carrying out the contract. But efficient ex ante contacting
would demand efficient allocation of all of the risks that might impede the
contract, not just the one that happened to come to fruition. The parties do
not know which of the many risks that are out there matter ex ante.109 In
short, there is no particular reason to assume that resolution of excuse cases
based on hypothetical consideration of who would have been the most
efficient bearer of the risk that happened to come to fruition will lead to
more efficient contracts. This seems, arguably, like an effort to wish away
the world of imperfect information in order to have contract law try to
ensure efficiency to the greatest extent possible, even when the uncertain
nature of the world means that parties cannot do this well with respect to
many contingencies.110
Not surprisingly, subsequent commentators have been less sanguine
than Posner and Rosenfield about the prospects for efficient excuse
doctrines. Alan Sykes, for example, in an exceedingly perceptive analysis
comes to the conclusion that figuring out efficient impracticability doctrine
is so difficult for a judge that courts attempting it may create transaction
costs without generating any offsetting economic benefit.111
Viewed from a different temporal frame of an instantaneous
transaction at t2 and as a very limited question, however, the efficiency of
excuse doctrines is not difficult at all. If performance has become
inefficient, courts should not require performance. This claim begs the
question of whether courts should order damages when performance
becomes inefficient. But from the perspective of analyzing the efficiency of
instantaneous exchange at t2 that question becomes pretty easy too: It does
not matter. Damages when performance is inefficient simply involve a
transfer payment that cannot influence efficiency.112 Hence, there may be
some reason for courts to view such questions as implicating fairness more
109

See generally Halpern, supra note 88, at 1160-61 (questioning whether parties are
able to adequately assess and bargain about an array of risks at t1).
110
See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 812, 815 (stating that actors tend to ignore or
underestimate future risks).
111
Sykes, supra note 19; see Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 251-53 (arguing that the
Posner/Rosenfield test is not administrable by judges). Other commentators have simply
opposed impracticability doctrine. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of
Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U.
TORONTO L. J. 450, 498 (1992) (opposing the doctrine on the ground that the parties, at
some level, allocate unexpected risks and that courts are unlikely to improve the parties’
allocation); White, supra note 69, at 354 (opposing discharge of contractual obligations,
because the remedy of expectation damages should prove more efficient).
112
See Friedman, supra note 79, at 8-9 (explaining that the question of how to remedy
the problem of breach induced by an offer of a higher price for contracted for good
implicates “entitlement,” not efficiency).
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than efficiency.113
3. Some Temporal Conclusions
Thus, the conflict between efficiency in one time frame with
efficiency in another gives rise to temporally inconsistent analysis of what
to do about breach of obligations that become inefficient at t2. Analysts
habitually employ a t1 timeframe to evaluate impracticability or
impossibility while inconsistently employing a t2 timeframe to analyze
efficient breach and questions of remedy. Furthermore, for either
affirmative defenses or damages questions, one can get different results
depending on the temporal timeframe to evaluate efficiency.
The economic dynamics of contract suggest not only a temporal
explanation for inconsistencies in efficiency analysis, but also a more
fundamental problem with efficiency. Analysts routinely write as if a clear
unitary concept governed the question of whether legal rules are efficient.
More commonly than many legal analysts imagine, efficiency in one
timeframe conflicts with efficiency in another.114 This means that efficiency
provides a less than completely coherent guide to the evaluation of legal
rules.
C. Understanding Impracticability as Management of Change over Time
An understanding of contract law as an effort to encourage
cooperative relationships over time provides a much more satisfying
explanation of contract law’s main features than the efficiency-based
perspective.115 A good illustration of this comes from the law of excuse
mentioned earlier, which provides the major exception to the rule that
courts enforce inefficient bargains.
Traditional law and economics scholarship finds it difficult to
account for the rationales courts actually offer for rulings when parties raise
defenses of impossibility or impracticability. Alan Sykes finds the excuse
113

See Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 746 (claiming that “fairness” is the goal of the
doctrines of impossibility and frustration); see generally George M. Cohen, The Fault that
Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1445 (2009).
114
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 36 (2006) (describing
intellectual property as involving a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency); David
M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT'L L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10094 (2003) (suggesting a similar tension in environmental law); see generally
DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 210-12 (discussing the problem of competing efficiencies more
broadly).
115
Accord, Halpern, supra note 88, at 1130 (arguing that impracticability doctrine
should provide “some certainty in planning”).
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cases unsatisfying from an efficiency perspective because the judges writing
these decisions fail to grapple with the question of how much unexpected
cost is too much relative to benefits, the question that should lie at the heart
of an effort to make contract law efficient (at least at t3).116 He draws the
logical conclusion from this lack of interest in the scale of potential losses
as compared with the possible benefits—the courts simply have no interest
in economic efficiency.117 Richard Posner, by the way, does not exactly
disagree with him. Instead, he argues that an implicit economic logic
accounts for the cases’ main results, but admits that the “courts have not
explicitly characterized the problem” of when to excuse performance as
“one of identifying the superior risk bearer.”118 It would be surprising
indeed if judges expressing little or no interest in efficient results somehow
stumbled upon rules that produced efficient outcomes. Alan Sykes’
conclusion that the courts do not pursue efficient results in these cases (and
could not achieve them with any regularity if they tried) has the virtue of
aligning judges’ purposes with what the judges say they are doing.119
We can, however, more easily understand the excuse doctrine in
terms of the economic dynamics of change over time. If one sees these
doctrines as trying to provide a stable environment for contracting in a
world that sometimes upsets parties’ expectations, then the justifications
judges actually offer for their decisions become much easier to understand.
Judges seeking to make contracting for future performance a
reasonably stable exercise should not excuse performance based on
circumstances likely to reoccur in a large number of cases. Hence, the main
thrust of an excuse doctrine should be to excuse performance only when
extraordinary circumstances make performance impossible or extremely
difficult.120 Accordingly, in the opinion of the drafters of the Second
Restatement of Contracts, judges have made extraordinary circumstances a

116

See Sykes, supra note 19, at 75 (lamenting the lack of judicial guidance about how
great a cost increase is too much and pointing out that efficiency does not turn solely on the
magnitude of cost increases).
117
See id. at 44 (finding legal doctrine “quite insensitive to the economic factors”
determining the efficiency of discharge and questioning “the efficiency of the
impracticability defense in practice”).
118
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 60, at 84, 107 (concluding that the excuse
doctrines have an “implicit economic logic” but admitting that courts do not explicitly seek
to identify superior risk bearers).
119
See Sykes, supra note 19, at 93-94 (finding existing doctrine “devoid of any
apparent economic foundation,” but suggesting that courts will rarely have sufficient
information to craft efficient discharge doctrine).
120
See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1355 (pointing out that “variations in the value of
performance . . . are the rule not the exception” and suggesting that therefore parties should
“swallow their losses” unless caused by unforeseeable events).
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prerequisite for abrogation of contract under the excuse doctrines.121
Ordinary circumstances cannot justify excused performance, not because
they cannot render a contract inefficient (ordinary circumstances can do that
just as often as extraordinary circumstances), but because they arise too
frequently.122
This focus on extraordinary causes also manifests itself in the
courts’ emphasis on foreseeability.123 As a general rule, courts will not
discharge contracts based on foreseeable contingencies that arise after
contracts are signed making performance difficult.124 Parties tend to foresee
the sorts of contingencies that recur frequently, but often fail to anticipate
unusual events.125 Hence, the foreseeability requirement leads to
enforcement in the mine run of cases, confining discharge of contractual
obligations to unusual cases.126
The focus on foreseeability also seeks stability by discouraging
resort to litigation.127 Hence, courts sometimes justify the foreseeability
requirement by stating that foreseeable circumstances do not excuse
performance because the party seeking discharge “might have protected
himself in his contract.”128 This expresses a judicial preference for more
complete contracts that would allow parties to cope with foreseeable
changes in circumstances without resort to the courts.
This focus on the unusual helps explain a central preoccupation of
courts in these cases with the nature of the causes of failures to perform.129
121

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, introduction to Chapter 11 (emphasizing
that the excuse doctrines address the question of when “extraordinary circumstances”
justify excusing performance).
122
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 57, 153 P.2d 47, 52 (1944) (expressing
reluctance to apply impracticability doctrine to a leasehold, because government regulation
interfering with particular contemplated land uses is common during wartime).
123
See Halpern, supra note 86, at 1142 (arguing that the impracticability cases turn
“largely on foreseeability”).
124
See Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that “the impracticability defense . . . turns largely on foreseeability”).
125
The foreseeability test hinges upon what the parties reasonably should have
foreseen, not what they actually foresaw. See Halpern, supra note 88, at 1151. But it is
reasonable to expect them to foresee the commonplace rather than the unusual. So, the
focus on “objective” foreseeability does not undermine the point that foreseeability implies
a focus on the unusual.
126
See generally Waldinger, 775 F.2d at 786 (linking foreseeability to an inquiry into
whether the occurrence triggering the defense “was so unusual or unforeseen” as to justify
a conclusion that this is not what the parties bargained for).
127
See Halpern, supra note 88, at 1144 (noting that an impracticability defense rarely
prevails).
128
See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (1975).
129
Cf. Halpern, supra note 88, at 1138-39 (arguing that the doctrine should focus on
qualitative evaluation of “how different” contractual performance has become in light of
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Hence, the courts excuse compliance with a contract to hold a concert when
the hall specified in the contract disappears, having burned to the ground,
when the person to perform a personal services contract dies, or when a
legal change makes performance impossible.130
By contrast, the failure of a supplier to come through does not
ordinarily excuse a seller of goods dependent on the supplier from
delivering goods to the buyer.131 Suppliers mess up all of the time, and if
that excused performance, breach of contract would become routine in a
large class of cases involving inefficient performance. This helps explain
why Justice Cardozo declines to excuse compliance with a supply contract
as a general matter, declaring that obligations will persist though “times
turn out to be hard and labor charges high,” but concedes that if the
supplier’s facility is destroyed, a defense based on impossibility or
impracticability might succeed.132 Similarly, a supplier’s lack of financial
resources does not excuse performance, even though this lack might make
performance literally impossible in some cases.133 Creation of a stable
environment for managing change can explain the courts’ emphasis on the
causes of non-performance, a feature having no obvious relationship to
efficiency.134
The courts do, at least occasionally, consider the costliness of
performance, but not in a way that suggests any particular concern with
economic efficiency. Part two explained that the courts have specifically
renounced any allegiance to efficiency by declaring that a contract
becoming unprofitable, and therefore presumably not Pareto Optimal, does
not justify discharge of contractual obligations. Mainstream decisions
adjudicating impracticability claims under the UCC usually pay no attention
supervening events).
130
See Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (King’s Bench, 1863)
(excusing performance when Surrey Garden and Music Hall burn to the ground before the
concert date); Page, supra note 29, at 600-02 (describing cases involving destruction of the
subject matter of a contract, death of a party to a contract, and legal changes as “three well
settled classes” of impossibility cases) .
131
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261 cmt. e (stating that a party
contracting to render performance “that depends on some act of a third party” ordinarily
cannot escape its obligation if the third party fails to perform). cf. Selland Pontiac-GMC,
Inc. v. King, 384 N.W.2d 490 (Minn Ct. App. 1986) (honoring an escape clause excusing
the seller of school buses if its source of supply for chassis failed).
132
See Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 384385 (N.Y. 1932) (assuming that destruction of the supplier’s facility would excuse
performance, but rejecting excuse based on the supplier’s underproduction).
133
See La Motte v. Hilgedick, 1992 U.S. App. Lex. 4020, *12 (9th Cir.) (unpublished
opinion).
134
See Wright, supra note 108, at 2184 (noting that courts rarely excuse performance
based on impracticability).
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the relationship between the promisor’s increased cost and the economic
value of the benefit to the promisee, i.e. to the issue of efficiency. Typically,
they focus on evaluating the question of whether the increased cost
produces an unacceptable economic hardship for the promisor.135 This
inquiry more closely resembles the feasibility inquiry in environmental law
(which asks whether proposed pollution control requirements might
bankrupt a large number of plants) than the cost-benefit analysis associated
economic efficiency’s pursuit.136
The case usually cited as the font of the commercial impracticability
doctrine, Mineral Park Land Co., v. Howard,137 for example, reflects some
concern about costs, but refutes the idea that economic inefficiency could
justify excusing compliance with a clear contract. The Howard court
released a party from a contract to take all the gravel and earth needed for a
bridge construction project from the plaintiff’s land.138 The defendant
discovered that half of the gravel and earth needed lay below the water table
and therefore took only about half of the amount contracted for.139 The trial
court rejected defendant’s argument that taking the gravel below the water
table was impracticable, even though it found that removal of that gravel
would cost “10 to 12 times as much as the usual cost.”140 The California
Supreme Court reversed, construing the contract as limited to “available”
gravel.141 It found the gravel unavailable both because the defendants
135

See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, 415 F. Supp. at 441 (rejecting claims for impracticability
when Gulf Oil cannot show that the increased price of crude oil created any hardship for
the company in carrying out a supply contract).
136
See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
BOST. COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L REV. 1, 12 (2005) (describing feasibility analysis as focused on
figuring out whether the costs of environmental regulation will produce plant shutdowns
and contrasting it with cost-benefit analysis); ALCOA v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 72 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (stating that impracticability doctrine focuses “distinctly on
hardship”). Cf. Halpern, supra note 88, at 1156-57 (expressing doubt about the coherence
of an emphasis on hardship). I am grateful to Robin Malloy for suggesting that I make this
parallel explicit here. This is not to say that courts do this consistently, but rather that this is
the central meaning of suggesting that cost renders a contract impracticable, as opposed to
undesirable.
137
172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
138
Howard, 172 Cal. at 293 (finding no recovery because it was impracticable to
remove all of the gravel and earth needed for a bridge).
139
Id. at 291 (noting trial court’s finding that the land contained about 101,000 cubic
yards of gravel and earth, but that the plaintiff only took about 50,131 cubic yards, the
amount above the water table).
140
Id. (noting that the trial court found the defendants obligated take all of the gravel
needed for the bridge).
141
Id. at 293 (construing the contract as requiring the taking of “available” gravel and
then finding the gravel not reasonably available).

30

CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFICIENCY

[7-Feb-11]

“could not take it by ordinary means” (a rationale sounding in extraordinary
circumstances) or without “prohibitive cost.”142 Although relying in part on
an unreasonable cost rationale, even this court disclaimed any allegiance to
efficiency, explaining that it did not “mean to intimate” that a mere showing
of financial loss would suffice to justify discharge.143 In other words, lack
of Pareto Optimality could not justify discharge, but a combination of some
unusual circumstances and extremely high costs could. And Mineral Park
Land constitutes something of an outlier in the emphasis it places on the
amount of costs.144
This inattention to the relationship between costs and benefits
suggests that courts not only regularly enforce contracts that no longer
exhibit Pareto efficiency, they do so without regard to the question of
whether a Pareto inefficient bargain might pass a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
test. By focusing solely upon the costs of compliance, and not the benefits,
they eschew consideration of the question of whether an unprofitable, and
hence Pareto inefficient contract, might nevertheless prove Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, because performance’s benefits to the promisee might outweigh
the negative costs to the promisor. This further cements the case for contract
law’s inefficiency, showing that it goes beyond enforcement of Pareto
inefficient agreements.
Hence, while judges disclaim any intent to excuse inefficient
performance under the excuse doctrines, they regularly focus on factors that
matter to an effort to promote a reasonably stable environment for contract
law. They generally manage contract’s economic dynamics by excusing
performance only in exceptional circumstances that make performance
ludicrous. The main rule remains that contract law enforces inefficient
bargains in order to encourage long-term cooperation through contracts.
D. Toward an Economic Dynamic Approach
Although law and economics scholars have not explicitly faced the
tension between efficient contracting and inefficient performance, they
exhibit acute awareness of the fact that new circumstances can arise that
make performance economically inefficient. Indeed, that insight lies at the
heart of the whole debate about efficient breach. As a result, the law and
economics of contract has, for at least two decades, explicitly included the
142

Id.
Id. (disclaiming any intimation that showing that performing an obligation was
“more expensive than . . . anticipated” or would “entail a loss” could justify excusing
performance).
144
See Subha Narasimhan, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1177 n. 143 (1986) (characterizing
Mineral Park Lands as a rare exception to the rule that increased costs do not justify
discharge).
143
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analysis of transaction costs and imperfect information.145 The reality that
an assumption of perfect information and zero transaction costs assumes
away many of the most interesting problems in the field has forced the law
and economics of contract to grapple with institutional law and
economics.146
An economic dynamic approach derived from institutional
economics holds great promise for further improving our understanding of
contract law, and indeed, of law generally.147 This approach focuses on
analyzing change over time, and views law as establishing temporarily
extended societal commitments, rather than as insuring instantaneous
efficient individualist transactions.148 Economic dynamic analysis involves
systematically analyzing how relevant actors behave in response to legal
rules under constraints imposed by bounded rationality and limited
information.149 The bounded rationality concept, borrowed from
institutional economics, assumes that actors (including both individuals and
institutions) do not pay attention to all potentially relevant information (as
per the perfect information assumption), but instead only pay attention to
information that their habits and routines make salient.150 It follows that
145

See Craswell, supra note 7, at 638-40 (discussing articles from the 1970s through
the middle 1980s that focus on the transaction costs of renegotiation); see, e.g., Richard
Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrine,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 64 (1993) (arguing that the choice between property and liability rule
protection in a contract case should depend on the “cost of overcoming the impediment to
consent that provides the reason for invalidating [a]. . . contract”). Cf. Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between Private and Collective
Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S657 (2002) (claiming that “[n]eoclassical
economists ignored” contractual puzzles, because “discussion of market-clearing prices
sets aside” problems stemming from incomplete information and an uncertain future).
146
See Craswell, supra note 7, at 634-35 (showing that the problems of efficiency
analysis being hopelessly indeterminate led to efforts to take transaction costs into
account). Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 865 (pointing out that if “individuals were rational,
with no cognitive limits, and if transaction costs were zero” contract law would be “simple
and uninteresting.”)
147
I advance the latter argument in a forthcoming book. See DRIESEN, supra note 11
(canvassing the work of scholars in a variety of areas that employ economic dynamic
analysis or some of its elements). I cannot defend such a broad claim here and instead
focus on defending my claim that the economic dynamic approach has value in the study of
contract law.
148
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1813 (arguing that modern contract law is “in
large part dynamic”).
149
See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 7-8 (explaining the concept of bounded rationality
and showing how it aids evaluation of how actors respond, or fail to respond, to potentially
relevant legal rules).
150
See ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND
BEYOND 106-07, 178-79, 185, 188-91 (Oliver Williamson, ed. 1995), MERCURO &
MEDENA, supra note 78, at 244-45 (explaining bounded rationality’s importance to the new
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actors will not necessarily respond to or even notice all nominally relevant
legal incentives.151 Economic dynamic analysis demands considering the
bounds limiting the rationality of individual actors that legal rules
potentially affect in order to analyze how the rules might influence them.152
Furthermore, the economic dynamic approach assumes that the law
does not provide all relevant incentives influencing action.153 At times, nonlegal incentives may countervail or otherwise influence response to legal
incentives.154 Hence, economic dynamic analysis requires consideration of
relevant non-legal incentives that may influence response to legal rules.155
Thus, economic dynamic analysis eschews the simplistic approach to
economic incentives found in many law review articles, which “analyze”
economic incentives by simply noting what sort of incentive a law creates,
thereby leaving the impression that all (or nearly all actors) will respond in
a linear knowledgeable way to law.156
Economic dynamic analysis provides a useful tool for lawyers,
because law usually manages change over time. Laws constitute
temporarily extended commitments that shape a society’s trajectory.157
Even in the contract realm, typified by transactions, law manages change
over time, not instantaneous exchange.158
Much of the preceding analysis of temporal inconsistency in the law
and economics of contract scholarship employs an economic dynamic
approach. The focus on change over time that characterizes this approach
enables one to see the temporal inconsistencies highlighted above. And a
number of analytical moves made rely on the limits of bounded rationality
to question whether rules that analysts characterized as efficient would
produce the behavior needed for those claims to prove correct.
Nor am I alone in employing economic dynamic analysis to gain
institutional economics).
151
See DRIESEN supra note 1, at 8 (illustrating this point with the question of whether
the “tax on marriage” influences decisions about whether to marry).
152
See ID. (noting that use of the bounded rationality assumption implies a need to
study individual and institutional behavior).
153
See ID. (calling for analysis of non-legal incentive’s effects on behavior potentially
influenced by law).
154
ID.
155
See ID.
156
Cf. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CINN. L. REV.
1283, 1305-1306 (1990) (explaining that as an empirical matter contract law is not “among
the more important elements of the incentive structure” influencing people in business).
157
JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 85 (2001) (pointing out that law on exists “over time,” because law implies
that after a rule is established it is followed).
158
Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 816 (characterizing “discrete contracts” as “almost
nonexistent” because contracts generally “create or reflect relationships”).
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insight into contract law. Perhaps the best example of the move toward
adopting an economic dynamic approach rooted in the tradition of
institutional economics involves Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner’s seminal
work on default rules in contract law.159 Ayres and Gertner begin with the
legal fiction that I identified as a staple of the law and economics of
contract, the idea that economic analysis should favor the rules that the
parties would have agreed upon if they had only thought of it (notice that if
they did not, probably transaction costs were too high).160 They label rules
that apply to fill out incomplete contracts (such as rules about what
remedies to employ in the event of non-performance in the absence of an
express contractual term on the subject) as default rules.161 But they notice
that the law does not permit parties to contract around all default rules.162
They question the fiction that contract rules simply supply terms that the
parties would have wanted by examining these “immutable” default rules—
rules that parties may not abrogate.163 Examples of immutable default rules
include the duty to act in good faith under the UCC and the requirement of
consideration to form a valid contract.164 In particular, they show that some
rules—“penalty” default rules—deliberately seek to provide contractual
terms that at least one party does not want in order to encourage the
revelation of information leading to more complete contracts than the
parties would otherwise agree to.165
This idea of a penalty default rule and the theory Ayres and Gertner
develop to guide judicial choice of default rules depend heavily on taking
imperfect information and transaction costs seriously. They point out that
the transaction cost explanation of contractual incompleteness suggests that
courts can minimize contracting costs by choosing rules that the parties
would have wanted.
But they go on to conduct an economic dynamic analysis of how
these rule choices might influence both parties to a contract.166 This yields
the conclusion that sometimes choosing a default rule favored by a minority
of parties may produce more efficient outcomes than majority default
rules.167 Furthermore, courts face information deficits and transaction costs
that may make determination of the rule that parties would have wanted
159
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difficult.168 In that case, courts may want to establish “penalty” default rules
establishing terms of contracts that at least one party does not want, in order
to induce the parties to contract explicitly about the issue the default rule
addresses.169 For example, the UCC voids contracts that do not mention the
quantity of goods to be supplied.170 Since a contract indicates that parties
did not intend a supply of zero goods, this rule penalizes parties for not
including a quantity term, thereby forcing them to negotiate about the
amount of goods to be sold.171 They take incomplete information into
account when they argue that the need to encourage parties to reveal
information to each other or the court can justify penalty default rules.172
Thus, they analyze the dynamics of negotiation that can either preserve or
remedy informational asymmetries.
Their analysis also explicitly considers how the bounds of rationality
will lead some actors to disregard incentives the law creates. For example,
they argue for a penalty default rule requiring that earnest money paid by a
buyer as security against breach of a real estate contract go the seller, rather
than the real estate broker, in the event of buyer default.173 They rationalize
this result by pointing out that the seller “may not even consider the issue of
how to split the earnest money in the event of default,”174 thereby assuming
that bounds on the seller’s rationality usually lead her not to consider
information about the splitting issue. Instead of assuming that the legal rules
governing splitting of earnest money will provide an incentive that the seller
will respond to, they recognize that she probably will not know the legal
rule governing this issue.175
By contrast, they argue, the broker will likely know the default rule for
splitting earnest money.176 This observation relies implicitly on the notion
that brokers engage in a routine of facilitating multiple real estate
transactions that make the question of how to treat earnest money in a failed
transaction salient enough for the legal rule to fall, at least fairly often,
within the bounds of the brokers’ rationality. Accordingly, the
168
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knowledgeable brokers, unlike the ignorant sellers, will likely respond to
the legal incentives that the earnest money splitting rules create. Hence, if
the governing rule states that the broker keeps the money, a broker will not
raise the issue, because the broker will profit from the seller’s ignorance.177
Conversely, if the rule states that the sellers keep the earnest money, the
broker may raise the issue, thereby informing the ignorant buyer, in hopes
of persuading the buyer to split the proceeds with her.178 This analysis
depends heavily on analyzing the nature of bounded rationality for
particular classes of parties, as economic dynamic theory recommends.
Similarly, Ayres and Gertner argue for a rule not requiring damages
when a buyer breaches a promise to buy a retail good relying on the
observation that “the customer may not know the default rule for breach.”179
Accordingly, a zero damages rule creates a dynamic that may induce the
seller, who probably does know the default rules for retail sale promises, to
inform the buyer about the rules if she wants to put herself in a position to
claim damages.180 Thus, Ayres and Gertner implicitly analyze the limits of
bounded rationality of particular classes of parties in order to examine the
economic dynamics of contractual rules. More generally, Ayres and
Gertner display an admirable awareness of the economic dynamics of
contracting in the face of bounded rationality when they admonish judges to
“consider the possibility that some parties will fail to contract around
penalty defaults out of ignorance or oversight.”181
They go on to consider a countervailing incentive that may defeat
the incentives a zero damages default rule creates to bargain for a
contractual term creating a damage remedy for breach of a promise to buy
from the retailer, thereby conforming to the demand of economic dynamic
theory that analysis include consideration of relevant non-legal
incentives.182 They note that in order to obtain the damage remedy
envisioned in the legal literature on this problem—lost profits—the seller
would have to reveal her markup to the buyer.183 They explain that
revelation of a mark-up can increase the power of the buyer to obtain a
177
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better price.184 This may lead sellers to decline to reveal their mark-ups
thereby defeating the zero damages default rule’s incentive to create
informed negotiation about damages in the event of a breach.185 Thus,
Ayres and Gertner analyze not just the incentives law creates, but
countervailing economic incentives that may defeat the law’s objectives.
Although Ayres and Gertner employ an economic dynamic analysis
in pursuit of efficient rules, once can employ economic dynamic analysis to
model fair results.186 For this form of analysis enables scholars to predict
how rules will influence behavior that can be judged according to either
fairness or efficiency norms. The economic dynamic approach provides
both a better foundation than the neoclassical model for choosing efficient
rules and a superior method for identifying fair rules. It simply offers a
better approach than the traditional approach to analyzing legal rules’
effects, regardless of the normative values guiding the analysis.
Thus, we see that contract law’s inefficiency undermines a major
justification for a focus on efficient contract law, explains the temporal
basis for the inconsistent results the search for efficiency has yielded, and
provides a means of understanding excuse doctrines’ emphasis on unusual
circumstances. The dynamics of the problem of new circumstances making
the apparently efficient contract inefficient, however, have forced legal
scholars to abandon neoclassical law and economics in favor of an
institutional approach, with some of the best work employing economic
dynamic analysis to provide a superior approach to understanding contract
law. An economic dynamic approach to this subject shows great promise.
CONCLUSION
Although contracting parties enact bargains they expect to be
efficient, courts regularly enforce inefficient bargains after a party has
determined that performance no longer servers her interests. Doing so
produces a sensible economic dynamic that helps parties cooperate and
manages change over time. This dynamic serves important macroeconomic
ends.
This tension between efficient contracting and inefficient
performance raises some questions about the value of focusing analysis
solely on efficiency. It helps explain law and economics’ inconsistent
184
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results as a product of manipulating timeframes in an effort to cope with the
dilemma this tension implies. Recognizing contract law as an effort to
manage change over time can help explain the exceptions to the rule that
courts enforce inefficient contracts, showing that the judicial focus on
unusual circumstances allows discharge only where it does not threaten to
significantly disrupt future contracting.
All of this commends an understanding of contract law in economic
dynamic terms, rather than as an exercise in static efficiency. An emerging
mode of institutional economic analysis, economic dynamic analysis,
provides a means of understanding change over time and therefore a fine
tool for examining contract law’s economic dynamics.

